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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
Case No. 
14589 
ROY H. HEL11, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Roy H. Helm, appeals from a 
judgment entered against him in the Second Judicial District 
of Utah, the Honorable Thornley K. Swan presiding, following 
a conviction for tampering with evidence. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was found guilty by a jury on Harch 26, 
1976, of tampering with evidence in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-510 (1953), and sentenced April 19, 1976. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks an order of this Court 
affirming the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the 
trial court. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with the statement of 
facts as submitted by Appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATE DID PROVE ALL THE ELEMENTS OF 
ITS CASE AND THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL. 
In order to satisfy its burden of proof, 
the State must present sufficient evidence to 
establish each element of the crime charged. Proper 
reading of the applicable statutes and careful 
examination of the testimony presented at trial 
necessitate the conclusion that the State carried 
its burden in the present case. 
in part: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1973), reads 
"A person commits a felony 
of the second degree if, believing 
that an official proceeding or 
investigation is pending or about 
to be instituted, he: 
(1) Alters, destroys, con-
ceals or removes anything with a 
purpose to impair its verity or 
availability in the proceeding or 
investigation." 
-2-
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The first requirement for a person to be 
guilty of this crime is that he believes an official 
proceeding or investigation pending or about to be 
instituted. 
Appellant's argument in regards to this 
requirement interprets the wording too compartmentally. 
The point at which an investigation ends and an official 
proceeding begins is not always clear and definite. 
The line appellant wants to draw between the two is not 
always present. 
App2lla~t's argument also seems to ignore some 
basic facts of this present case. It is clear from the 
testimony of both Trooper Busch and Sergeant Hatch that 
Mr. Eccles had been arrested for driving under the influence 
of alcoholic beverages by Trooper Busch and that he had 
been taken to the Farmington Sheriff's Office for the 
purpose of being booked into the jail for this offense. 
Appellant was completely apprised of this situation by 
the time he arrived at Farmer's State Bank. 
It is obvious that appellant, a Colonel in the 
Highway Patrol, knew that an official judicial proceeding 
-3-
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against Mr. Eccles would soon be instituted to adjudicate 
this charge. Appellant also knew that the evidence 
gathered by Trooper Busch would be essential for the 
purpose of the State proving its case in such a proceeding. 
The narrow interpretation of the statute advocato 
by appellant is so restrictive that the purpose and intew. 
of the statute would be defeated. 
The second element of this crime, concealing m 
removing the materials, was satisfied when appellant retai:· 
the evidence which Trooper Busch had assembled. Appellant 
caused this evidence to be removed from the trooper a~ 
therefore removed it from the normal, procedural course 
it would have followed had appellant not intervened. The 
retension of this evidence is concealment due to the mere 
fact it rightly should have been returned to the trooper 
or turned in to be properly dealt with and filed. 
[I]ntent may be 
inferred from conduct of a 
defendant and from circumstantial 
evidence upon which reasonable 
inferences may be based." 
Deeter v. State, 500 P.2d 68 
(Wyo. 1972); Stuebgen v. State, 
548 P.2d 870 (\~yo. 1976); 
People v. Braly, 532 P.2d 325 
(Colo. 1975). 
-4-
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Appellant questioned Trooper Busch as to 
whether or not anyone had seen Mr. Eccles being brought 
into the station; he recognized that proceedings were 
inevitable against Mr. Eccles unless he intercepted the 
damaring evidence; he reiterated, several times, that 
Mr. Eccles was a powerful person who could harm the 
Highway Patrol; he took control of the evidence that 
night and never returned it to the investigating 
officer. 
All these facts lead to the reasonable inference 
that appellant re;noved and concealed this e':ic'.'.<:c~" Eor 
the purpose of impairing its availability at any future 
proceeding which would be instituted against Mr. Eccles 
in regards to this drunk driving charge. The motive for 
such action was to insure that Mr. Eccles would not 
retaliate against the Highway Patrol or individual 
officers. Although this intent was not obvious at the 
time appellant asked for and took the evidence, such 
intent is obvious when one views the totality of 
appellant's actions in regards to this evidence. 
-5-
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POINT II 
TESTIMONY GIVEN BY STATE'S \HTNESSES D 
NOT REQUIRE CORROBORATION AND THE COURT PROPERLY 
DENIED APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL. 
in part: 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-18 (1953) , states 
"A conviction shall not be 
had on the testimony of an 
accomplice, unless he is corroborated 
by other evidence, which in itself 
tends to connect the defendant with 
the commission of the offense. 
Apparently it is appellant's argument that 
there was a conspiracy among appellant and State's 
witnesses and therefore the State's witnesses were 
accomplices of appellant. Both the basis and conclu-
sian of this argument are fallacious. 
Conspiracy is a specific intent crime. There 
was nothing said or done by appellant or State's wit~s~ 
which implied that any of them had the intent to make an 
agreement to conceal or remove the evidence. The troope: 
had no idea that appellant \vOuld consequently do just t~: 
Wi·~:hout this intent, without an agreement, there coulc :, 
no conspiracy. 
-6-
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The more relevant conclusion, however, is 
that State's witnesses were not accomplices of the 
appellant. 
This Court has had several opportunities 
to define the meaning of "accomplice." 
"In this State we have no 
statutory definition of accomplice, 
but the court has construed the 
word to refer to one who is or 
co~ld be charged as a principle 
with defendant on trial." State 
v. Coroles, 74 Utah 94, 277 Pac. 
203 (1929); State v. Fertig, 233 
P.2d 347 (1951); State v. Kasai, 
27 Utah 2d 326, 495 P.2d 1265 
( 197 2) . 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1973), spells 
out who can be guilty as a principle: 
"Every person, acting with 
the mental state required for the 
commission of an offense who 
directly commits the offense, who 
solicits,requests, commands, 
encourages or intentionally aids 
another person to engage in 
conduct which constitutes an 
offense shall be criminally liable 
as a party for such conduct." 
Again, the all important intent is 
lacking. These two troopers had no knowledge or 
-7-
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intent that the evidence would be kept and concealed 
by appellant, and, in fact, subsequently signed a 
complaint against Mr. Eccles on this charge (T.28). 
Although it was logical for the troopers to assume 
that appellant was going to give Mr. Eccles speci~l 
treatment in this matter, it did not follow that h-" 
would break the law in doing so. They are guilty 
only of following orders--orders which were not 
patently criminal or wrongful. It is quite common 
and totally acceptable for an officer to permit 
a senior office~ to intervene in particularl~· 
sensitive situations. 
Since the State's witnesses lacked the 
necessary intent to be charged as a principle, 
they are not accomplices and their testimony is 
more than sufficient to sustain this conviction. 
-8-
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POHJT III 
THE LO\':SR COURT DID HAVE JURISDICTION TO 
SENT£;;:::£ THE APPELLl,:JT. 
Utah law requires that: 
"[A]fter a verdict of 
guilty if judgYl.ent is not 
arrested. . the Court must 
appoin~ a time for pronouncing 
judgment, which must be at least 
two days and not more than ten 
days after the verdict." 
Utah Cede Ann. § 77-35-l (1953, 
as amended) . 
This statute presents the problem of determining whether 
the \lord "must" is mandatory or directory only. An 
analysis of cases through the years establishes the process 
be rncle. 
In an early case the United States Supreme 
Cour~ discusse:l the P.:eaning of "shall 11 within a statute 
tha~ said every probationer shall be given a hearing. 
The Ccur~ first considered the words alone and then 
"':"he ce'•:·n:lc.nt shCill be dealt 
•.·ithin a stated -..:ay; it is languuge 
c~ co~--~~d. u test of significance, 
th'l: :h l'r:lt contcollinq. . Doubt, 
hr_.~·.·c·. :- . .- i~: d i=->r~'•-=llcd v1hen \·Jc pass 
fr(,:---, \.'G!:::: ,-tlu;;r~ to a v ir::!\·1 of the 
€: r. -~ ~ 2 r. l air:-::; . , Escoe v. Zerb~~t. 
.. L'J S C. S . 4 ':J () ( l 'J l:,) -
----
-'J-
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The Court concluded that the purpose of the statut~ 
was to protect the defendant from malicious, ungrounded 
charges and therefore "shall" was seen as command language, 
In State v. Nelson, 200 Kan. 411, 436 P.2d 
885 (1968), the Kansas Supreme Court applied this sa.ne 
test to determine the meaning of a statute, similar 
to the one in question, which said "if motion for new 
trial is overruled, sentence shall be imposed within 
five days. They reasoned that: 
[w]hen the legislature 
prescribes a time when an official 
act is to be performed, the broad 
legislative purpose is to be con-
sidered by the courts whenever they 
are called upon to decide whether 
·time prs.scribeG by statute is Fland.::---J.to;:-y 
or directory." Id. 887. 
In viewing tfie statute they concluded the purpose was 
to "prev~Gt prolonged, unreasonable delay in the 
sentencing of the defendant" and since the delay was 
not unreasonable, even though more than five days had 
elapsed, the court still had jurisdiction. 
The Ninth Circuit concurred with this process 
when it stated: 
. The interpretation of these 
words [shall and may) depends upon 
the background circumstances and con-
text in which they are used and the 
intention of the legislative body or 
administrative agen~y which used 
them." United States v. Fceb, 433 I'. 
2d 381, 383 (Ninth Circuit 1970). 
-10-
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Even in the case of Anderson v. Yungkau, 
3 2 9 U . S . 4 8 2 , 6 7 S . C t . 4 2 8 , 91 L. Ed . 4 3 6 ( 19 4 6) , 
which the appellant cites for proposition that "shall" 
was a word of command and not aC::visory, the Court 
buoyed their definition by concluding that " .. 
[r)easons of policy support this construction." Id. 
486. 
A singular look at the words of the statute in 
question would suggest that it is a mandatory time 
limit. However, it is important to take a further 
step and determine the legislative purpose for this 
statute. The purpose of the minimum limit is to 
mdnJJte ci~e for c~G judge to review t~e c~se ar1d ~he 
defendant and determine an appropriate sentence. The 
purpose of the maximum limit is to assure that the 
defendant will not be unreasonably detained without 
any sentence. The reason for the delay in imposing 
the sentence in the present case was that the judge 
had not received a report from the Adult Probation 
Department. Without this report the judge could not 
make an intelligent assessment of the appellant and 
therefore could not impose a well determined sentence. 
The delay was for the benefit of the appellant in that 
it assured a fairer sentence. 
-11-
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This was especially true in this case be-
cause the appellant had not offered any evidence 
in his defense nor had he given his account of 
the situation. Without the report the judge had 
absolutely nothing by which to evaluate the appellant. 
Even the appellant's counsel recognized the importance 
of having available additional information at time 
of sentencing when he asked that the results of 
a polygraph test be made part of the file and taken 
into account when the judge decide] on the sentence. 
(T. 94). 
When dealing with the meaning of this 
"This court has held that the 
tim2 fixed by the statute is not 
J~ri~~ictional. . and since it 
~~ resarded as merely directory 
the further provision that the 
judJment should be rendered within 
a reasonable time has been read 
into the statute." State v. Fedder, 
262 P.2d 753, 755 (1953). In 
accord State v. Saxton, 30 Utah 2d 
456, 519 P.2d 1340 (1974). 
Considering the acceptable excuse for the 
delay it must be concluded that sentence was rendered 
-12-
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within a reasonable time and the court had jurisdiction 
to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, respondent respectfully 
requests that the judgment of the lower court be 
aff irmeC.::. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM T. EVANS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
-13-
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